Book Review by unknown
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 38
Issue 1 2005 Article 7
Book Review
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
(2005) "Book Review," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 38: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol38/iss1/7
No Purchase Necessary
Drury Stevensont
Marco A. Olsen, Analysis of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants (2003).
If laws without sanctions are no laws at all, as some would say, the
recent Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants' (the "Con-
vention") could be placed in the category of harmless collective goodwill
gestures, a collaborative effort in toothless public relations. Why, then, did
the United States quarrel and negotiate as if national interests were at
stake?
Professor Marco Olsen offers a glimpse into an answer in his brilliant
new book, Analysis of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Poilu-
tants.2 His concise treatise is the only book to date on the subject but is
t Visiting Scholar, Yale Law School, Summer 2004; Assistant Professor of Law,
South Texas College of Law. Many thanks to Fran Ortiz, Dick Graving, and Marco Olsen
for their helpful comments and input.
1. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 107-5, U.N. Doc. UNEP/POPS/CONF/2, 40 I.L.M. 532, available at http://
www.pops.int/documents/convtext/convtext-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2004) [herein-
after Stockholm Convention]. The Stockholm Convention went into effect May 17,
2004. The full text of the treaty, as well as other helpful background information and
updates, are available at the Convention's official website: http://www.pops.int/. The
Stockholm Convention is not to be confused with the Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1466 [hereinafter Stockholm Confer-
ence], which was the very first United Nations environmental conference, Jonathan L.
Hafetz, Fostering Protection of the Marine Environment and Economic Development: Article
121(3) of the Third Law of the Sea Convention, 15 AM. U. INr'L L. REV. 583, 595 (2000),
but did not focus specifically on organic pollutants, see supra Stockholm Conference.
The 1972 Stockholm Conference did, however, lead to the creation of the International
Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals ("l.R.P.T.C.") in 1976, a data bank of informa-
tion about various manmade substances, the potential health hazards they posed, and
the points of production and use for each. Linda A. Malone, Symposium: "Green Hel-
mets": A Conceptual Framework for Security Council Authority in Environmental Emergen-
cies, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 515, 526 n.49, 534 n.79 (1996) (noting that the United Nations
Environmental Programme ("U.N.E.P."), which was responsible for the creation of the
I.R.P.T.C., originated from the Stockholm Conference); IRPTC in the 1990s, at http://
www.chem.unep.ch/irptc/irptc/moreirpt.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2004). This registry,
and the international discussion it created, was undoubtedly part of the impetus for
more specific attention on Persistent Organic Pollutants nearly thirty years later. See
Erin Perkins, Hazardous Materials and Energy: The Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants: A Step Toward the Vision of Rachel Carson, 2001 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 191, 191-92 (noting that I.R.P.T.C. Director James Willis called the Stock-
holm Convention the "biggest achievement in international chemicals safety ever" due to
its emphasis on Persistent Organic Pollutants or "POPs"). For more information on the
I.R.P.T.C., see generally U.N.E.P. Chemicals' Programme, at http://www.chem.unep.ch/
irptc (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
2. MARCO A. OLSEN, ANALYSIS OF THE STOCKHOLM CONVENTION ON PERSISTENT
ORGANIC POLLUTANTS (2003).
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sufficiently comprehensive to give the reader a thorough grasp of the back-
ground, terms, and ramifications of the agreement. Olsen's writing is
detailed and systematic, yet his style is clear and accessible enough to pro-
vide a basic introduction to the field of international environmental law. It
is the first monograph on an important new treaty and is a smart addition
to any library.
Olsen's book is as timely as it is well-written. The Bush Administra-
tion has proposed a bill to make the Convention's term s the law of the land
in the United States; 3 Democrats have sponsored a rival proposal that goes
further and automatically incorporates by reference any future terms
amended to the Convention.4 Regardless of which proposal wins, the Con-
vention is soon to be a legal reality confronting American corporations and
exporters. The Convention took effect on May 17, 2004, ninety days after
being ratified by its fiftieth country.5 Significantly, the Convention calls
for the elimination of certain dangerous pesticides (such as dichloro-diphe-
nyl-trichloroethane or "DDT") that have been banned in developed coun-
tries for years. 6
The Stockholm Convention was the culmination of a long series of
other treaties and international conferences addressing interrelated topics.
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization ("F.A.O.") began
creating international rules for the transport and disposal of pesticides as
early as 1985 with its International Code of Conduct on the Distribution
3. POPs and PIC Implementation Act of 2002, S. 2507, 107th Cong. (2002).
4. POPs Implementation Act of 2001, S. 2118, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter the
'ijeffords Bill"]. For an analysis of both the recent Bush Administration proposal and the
Jeffords Bill, see generally Pep Fuller & Thomas 0. McGarity, Beyond the Dirty Dozen:
The Bush Administration's Cautious Approach to Listing New Persistent Organic Pollutants
and the Future of the Stockholm Convention, 28 WM. & MARY ENv-.. L. & POL'Y REv. 1
(2003). Fuller and McGarity are critical of the Bush proposal because it implements
only the existing terms of the Convention (which focus on the elimination of twelve
identified pollutants) without a provision that would allow Convention committees or
delegates to add additional chemicals to the list with an automatic application to Ameri-
can law. Id. at 10-11. Fuller and McGarity argue that this limitation betrays the Con-
vention's goals and purposes. Id. at 4 (arguing that the approach of the Jeffords Bill is
"more consistent with the language and spirit of the Stockholm Convention and more
sensible as a matter of domestic law"). The Stockholm Convention drafters envisioned a
committee of delegates that could add additional toxic chemicals to the list of the origi-
nal twelve (provisions found in Article 8), rather than changing incrementally by under-
taking another series of global meetings. Id. at 8-9, 14-15.
The merits of such a committee is frequently an issue with international treaties; on
the one hand, it seems tedious and expensive to send delegates to meetings and negotia-
tions each time a minor amendment or update is necessary, coupled with the hassle of
repeated ratifications. On the other hand, environmental activists could dominate com-
mittees and try to foist onerous new prohibitions onto the participants.
5. Stockholm Convention, supra note 1, art. 26, § 1, 40 I.L.M. at 550 ("This Con-
vention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit of the fiftieth
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession."). At the time of writing,
over 150 countries are signatories, while eighty-one have ratified the treaty. See Stock-
holm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, at http://
www.pops.int/documents/signature/signstatus.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
6. Stockholm Convention Annex A, supra note 1, Annex A, 40 I.L.M. at 551-54.
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and Use of Pesticides. 7 In 1989, the Code was amended to include an
important provision, which required "informed consent" by the recipients
of pesticide shipments about the hazards that pesticides pose.8 Compli-
ance, however, was voluntary. 9 Similarly, in 1987, the United Nations
Environmental Programme ("U.N.E.P.") produced its London Guidelines
for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade,
which paralleled the guidelines of the F.A.O.'s 1985 Code, but focused on
voluntary information exchange by users of pesticides, rather than by pro-
ducers or shippers. 10 The real lineage of the Stockholm Convention begins
with what is popularly known as the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 (formally
titled the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Develop-
ment, or "U.N.C.E.D."), which identified international collaboration on
chemical management as a top priority.1' Agenda 21 of the Rio Earth
Summit 12 led to the formation of the Intergovernmental Forum for Chemi-
cal Safety ("I.F.C.S.") in 1994,13 which met in Manila in 1996 and made
recommendations resulting in the creation of the International Negotiating
Committee ("I.N.C."). 14 The I.N.C. began treaty negotiations in earnest,
7. OLSEN, supra note 2, at 52 (citing FAO Res. 6/89, COAG, Report of the Confer-
ence of FAO, 95th Sess., U.N. Doc. C/89/Rep. 120 (1989)).
8. See id. at 52-54.
9. See id. at 54 (noting that the Code "does not contain any mechanisms to enforce
implementation, but rather relies upon collaborative efforts by all participating
partners").
10. See id. at 52-55. Besides these voluntary, "soft law" developments, a few bind-
ing treaties on other subjects overlapped with some of the provisions of the new Stock-
holm Convention: the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657 (focusing primarily
on the dumping of hazardous wastes in Africa); the 1990 International Labour Organi-
zation's Chemicals Convention (No. 170, 1990) and Recommendation (Number 177,
1990), reprinted in International Labour Conventions and Recommendations
1919-1991 (International Labour Organization ed., 1992) (focusing on the rights of
workers exposed to hazardous chemicals in the workplace); the Bamako Convention on
the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and
Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773 (1991)
(establishing a total ban on the import of hazardous wastes into Africa); the 1998 Proto-
col to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Persistent
Organic Pollutants, June 24, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 505, 513-29 [hereinafter L.R.T.A.P. POPs
Protocol], (focusing on industrial smog crossing national borders, including airborne
forms of some chemicals covered by the Stockholm Convention); and the Rotterdam
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedures for Certain Hazardous Chemi-
cals and Pesticides in International Trade, Sept. 11, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 1 (1999) (creating
binding requirements of "prior informed consent" by recipients of certain hazardous
chemicals and pesticides). See id. at 63-75.
11. See OLSEN, supra note 2 at 55-57, 77-78 (stating that "it was not until 1992 that
the absence of clear rules establishing acceptable global and regional standards ... was
first addressed" and that the U.N.C.E.D. "was the initial cornerstone of recognizing POPs
on the global level").
12. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/
Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874.
13. See id. at 60.
14. See id. at 83.
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with five international meetings over the next several years. 15 With the text
of the treaty nearly completed, the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries 16
convened in Stockholm on May 22-23, 2001 to finalize the terms and for-
mally adopt the treaty. 17
Olsen's book provides a colorful account of the crisis the Stockholm
Convention addressed: worldwide use of persistent organic pesticides.
Designated "POPs" in the alphabet soup of acronyms that make up envi-
ronmental law, Persistent Organic Pollutants are pesticides that do not
biodegrade for generations; once applied, they remain in the environment
for several centuries. 18 Worse, they also migrate through the air, water-
ways, and up the food chain. 19
The Stockholm Convention singles out twelve notorious POPs, fit-
tingly called "the dirty dozen."20 Olsen explains that all roads for the dirty
dozen lead to the polar ice caps.2 1 Air and ocean currents constantly push
there, and compounds that are fat-soluble rather than water-soluble (as
these pollutants are) accumulate fastest in creatures carrying the most
body fat-those living in cold climates. 2 2 Hence walruses, whales, and arc-
tic fishermen are among those that suffer the greatest indirect effects. 2 3
More immediately impacted are subsistence-wage plantation workers in
Guatemala and similar nations where unregulated work conditions fre-
quently leave them covered in toxic powder at the end of a workday. 24
15. These I.N.C. negotiation meetings occurred in Montreal (1998), Nairobi (1999),
Geneva (1999), Bonn (2000), and Johannesburg (2001). See id. at 83-103. Parallel to
these sessions, there were also two meetings of a "Criteria Experts Group" in Bangkok
(1998) and Vienna (1999) to focus on scientifically-based criteria and procedures to
identify and add other pollutants to the final document. See id. at 86-87, 90-91.
16. The Plenipotentiaries included representatives of 118 countries, nine U.N. bod-
ies and agencies, four intergovernmental organizations, and more than 100 nongovern-
mental organizations. Id. at 102.
17. See id. at 102-03.
18. Id. at 2-4.
19. Id. at 3-4.
20. Id. at xi, 2-3. The "dirty dozen" are: DDT, aldrin, dieldrin, endrin, chlordane,
heptachlor, hexachlorobenzene, mirex, toxaphene, polychlorinated biphenyls,
polychlorinated dibenzodioxins, and polychlorinated dibenzofurans. Id. at 3. Olsen's
book includes an entire chapter (chapter 2, approximately thirty pages) with a subhead-
ing devoted to each of the twelve, describing its molecular structure, commercial use,
toxicity, side effects, and where and how the substance is currently produced. See id. at
13-41.
21. See id. at 39-41.
22. Id.; see also Sarah R. Hamilton, Note, Toxic Contamination of the Arctic: Thinking
Globally and Acting Locally To Protect Arctic Ecosystems and People, 15 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 71, 81-85 (2004) (discussing the high concentrations of POPs and
other pollutants, such as heavy metals and radiation, in the Arctic region, resulting in
some of the highest levels of marine animal contamination on Earth).
23. See OLSEN, supra note 2, at 38-41, 108 (discussing 450 Inuits in Canada who
have a disproportionately high incidence of birth defects traced to POPs in their food
supply and noting the effect that POPs have on arctic mammals).
24. See id. at 39 (discussing the use of banned pesticides by developing countries);
Nancy S. Zahedi, Note, Implementing the Rotterdam Convention: The Challenges of Trans-
forming Aspirational Goals into Effective Controls on Hazardous Pesticide Exports to Devel-
oping Countries, 11 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 707, 711-12 (1999) (discussing the misuse
of highly toxic pesticides by Guatemalan farmers).
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Of course, pesticides are used because they are invaluable for killing
insects that carry diseases (especially malaria) or devour crops needed for
subsistence. In fact, the inventor of DDT received a Nobel Prize for his
lifesaving discovery. 25 Today, Stockholm signatories are scrambling to
remove DDT from stockpiles and storerooms.26 It is like a pendulum
swinging between pestilence and pesticides; currently pesticides are the
least favored.
POPs can thus kill mosquitoes, Guatemalan farmhands, and Inuit fish-
ermen in the same application, as the resilient chemicals migrate between
the north and south poles. The crusade to eradicate POPs, not surpris-
ingly, has originated in countries with arctic territories (Canada, Sweden,
etc.) and in tropical climates, including areas of Central America, Africa,
and Southeast Asia. 27 In between the members of this rather unusual, cli-
mate-diverse consortium are the industrial nations that manufacture the
"dirty dozen" to sell to the southern developing countries. 28 Most of these
industrial states banned the use of these chemicals within their own bor-
ders in the 1970s and 1980s, bowing to internal political pressure created
by exposes like Rachel Carson's book Silent Spring.2 9 Production contin-
ued, however, for export to nations with nascent agricultural systems and
pandemic insect-borne diseases. 30
The Stockholm Convention mandates a phaseout of the production
and export of the "dirty dozen" except for extenuating circumstances, such
as malaria epidemics, that require drastic, immediate action.3 1 One fasci-
nating section of Olsen's book offers charts that indicate the origin of pro-
duction for each chemical. 32 Interestingly, different industrialized nations
specialize in manufacturing different chemicals; for example, Germany has
a corner on the market of heptachlor3 3 (it is apparently not produced in
the United States), while the United States appears to be the major pro-
ducer of chlordane.34 This presents an opportunity for a type of competi-
25. Id. at 23 (discussing Swiss chemist Paul Muller's discovery of DDT's properties
as an insecticide and resultant 1948 Nobel Prize).
26. See id. at 2-3, 22-25.
27. OLSEN, supra note 2, at 40-41, 69, 98, 100. See generally Evan T. Bloom, Estab-
lishment of the Arctic Council, 93 AJ.I.L. 712 (1999) (discussing the formation of the
Arctic Council, a cooperative forum of eight states with territory in the Arctic region,
including Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United
States).
28. Id. at 6-8 tbIs. 1-2, 44.
29. See OLSEN, supra note 2, at 25, 43-45 (discussing RACHEL CARSON, SILENTr SPRING
(1962)); see also Erin Perkins, The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants:
A Step Toward the Vision of Rachel Carson, 2001 CoLo. J. Ir'L ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 191,
191-92.
30. OLSEN, supra note 2, at 43-44.
31. See id. at 107; Stockholm Convention, supra note 1, Annex B, 40 I.L.M. at
554-56 (allowing disease vector control use of DDT under certain circumstances).
32. See discussion in OLSEN, supra note 2, at 6-8 tbls. 1-2, 44.
33. See id. at 7 tbl. 2. For an example of U.S. litigation that deals with the effects of a
heptachlor contamination of a home as a termiticide, see Villari v. Terminix Intern., Inc.,
692 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.Pa. 1988).
34. Although Chlordane was banned in the United States for most uses in 1988,
OLSEN, supra note 2, at 21, it was applied as a pesticide (termite control) in approxi-
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tive environmental game: Germany could spearhead a crusade for more
draconian measures against chlordane, which would harm chemical com-
panies in the United States that compete in other areas with German chem-
ical firms (few companies produce only one chemical). U.S. corporations,
conversely, are more likely to lobby for strong international regulations
against heptachlor, partly to inconvenience their German rivals. As men-
tioned above, Sweden, which does not need the pesticides but faces envi-
ronmental contamination from them, has played the part of both victim
and vanguard in the area of pollutant regulation. 3 5 Given that its chemical
firms produce none of the proscribed contaminants, Sweden stands to
potentially benefit from the treaty.3 6 In theory, savvy environmentalists
could use strategic market forces to pit the chemical interests against each
other, eventually covering all their bases.
Of course, it is also possible that U.S. chemical companies want Ger-
man firms to produce heptachlor, rather than switch to a product that
American companies currently sell. Competitors in industries with high
entry barriers sometimes agree, tacitly or explicitly, to carve out geo-
graphic territories or to have exclusive product lines, giving each the bene-
fits of a limited monopoly. Rival chemical companies in that case are
fearful of being forced to compete over the remaining permitted product
lines and thus may have collusive incentives to oppose any of the regula-
tions (even those that affect their overseas competitors). By fending off
socially harmful coordination games, a treaty can become particularly val-
uable. The question of what products remain legal, however, leads to
another possible strategic twist, as well as my only quibble with Olsen's
book. The "dirty dozen" have been banned domestically for years; presum-
ably the manufacturers have developed alternative products to replace
them in the pesticide market. Olsen does not mention such substitutes,
but one would imagine they either exist or are being developed by the same
chemical conglomerates that brought us chlordane and the rest. Encourag-
ing or forcing the elimination of existing pesticide stockpiles creates an
mately thirty million homes before that date. Entry, 2051 Chlordane-Neurotoxicity, 8
OCCUPATIONAL MED. DIG. 17 (1996), WL 8 No. 2 OCCMEDDI 17. Subsequent studies
show substantial neurophysiological problems in tested subjects who were exposed to
the chemical in or near their apartments. See, e.g., id. (citing Kaye H. Kilburn &John C.
Thornton, Protracted Neurotoxicity from Chlordane Sprayed to Kill Termites, 103 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. 690, 690-94 (1995). For additional legal discussion of Chlordane, see
Texas High Court Declares Landlord's Contamination Claims Against Chlordane Maker
Time-Barred, 1997 ANDREWS Toxic CHEMICALS LITIG. REP. 25,281 (1998), WL 1997
ANTCLR 25281 (discussing Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Winograd, 956 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.
1997)); Toxicologist on Chlordane Exposure, 10 EXPERT WITNESS J. 8 (1998), WL 10 No. 10
EXPWITJ 8 (discussing incompleteness of toxicologist's affidavit in Vardaman v. Baker
Center, Inc., 711 So. 2d 727 (La. Ct. App. 1998)); Home Seller Has No Duty To Disclose
Chlordane Contamination, 9 N.Y. REAL EST. L. REP. 6 (1995) (discussing holdings of New
York case law on seller liability); Alice B. Lustre, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility
of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453, 502 (2001)
(noting incompleteness of toxicologists affidavit in Vardaman v. Baker Center, Inc., 711
So. 2d 727 (La. Ct. App. 1998)).
35. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
36. OLSEN, supra note 2, at 45-48.
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immediate demand for new supplies of pesticide-a potential windfall for
the manufacturer. 3 7 This may be the best explanation for why the chemi-
cal industry has acquiesced to ratification of the Convention, rather than
balking. It may stand to gain more than it loses under the treaty. Perhaps
subsequent editions of Olsen's book could include some hard data about
replacement product lines from the manufacturers of the original POPs.
The Stockholm Convention, like many other treaties, contains no
enforcement mechanism or penalties for noncompliance. 38 It is puzzling
that some countries, most notably the United States, invested resources to
fight doggedly over the use of certain terms or phrases in the final text
(most notably changing "precautionary principle" to "precautionary
approach"). 3 9 One wonders why they bothered, if the consequences for
37. Once a factory is outfitted to produce a new alternative to DDT, one of the big-
gest obstacles to increasing its market would be the existing stockpiles of DDT, perhaps
its own former product, in developing countries. Also, given that the manufacturers
already must produce the alternative product for its domestic market, it is likely to be
more efficient to manufacture only one, not two, pesticides. This can be achieved by
creating a large overseas market for its domestic product.
38. See OLSEN, supra note 2, at 117, 123; see also Joel A. Mintz, Two Cheers for Global
POPs: A Summary and Assessment of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollu-
tants, 14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 319, 332 (2001). Mintz laments the lengthy time
allowance for ratification, id. at 331, although the requisite number of countries (fifty)
has ratified the Convention since his writing, with France finally giving in as a last
holdout, see http://www.pops.int/documents/signature/signstatus.htm. He also
expresses concern over the two-decade phase-out periods for certain pollutants, most
notably polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and that phaseout methods are supposed to
consider a cost-benefit analysis. See Mintz, supra, at 331 (discussing Annex C of the
treaty).
39. See OLSEN, supra note 3, at 99-100. Olsen explains that "precautionary princi-
ple" is a term of art used in other treaties (and forerunner conventions to Stockholm)
that functions as a type of rule of jurisprudence, requiring that tough cases always be
resolved in favor of protecting the environment (as opposed to economic feasibility or
other considerations). See id. at 99-100, 109. The diluted phrase "precautionary
approach," on the other hand, implies a "lesser degree of importance or applicability."
Id. at 100. See also DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY
405-407 (2d ed. 2002) ("[Mlany commentators also argue that the precautionary princi-
ple acts to switch the burden of [scientific] proof necessary for triggering policy
responses from those who support prohibiting or reducing a potentially offending activ-
ity to those who want to continue the activity.").
The precautionary principle is a source of ongoing debate in other arenas besides the
Stockholm Convention on POPs, as indicated by a spate of recent articles. See, e.g.,
Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the
Proposed International Biosafety Protocol, 35 TEX. INT' L.J. 173, 194-204 (2000) (arguing
that application of the precautionary principle to biotechnology generally stifles valua-
ble research and development); John S. Applegate, The Prometheus Principle: Using the
Precautionary Principle To Harmonize the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 207-09 (2001) (arguing that the precautionary princi-
ple should be applied in the context of genetic modification practices); John S. Apple-
gate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
13, 15-16 (2002) (arguing that the strength of the verbal formulation has been steadily
diluted or eroded even as it has been more widely used); Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation in
WTO Law: A Procedure-Based Approach to the Precautionary Principle, 40 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 323, 323, 365-70 (2002) (arguing that procedures should be implemented to
foster democratic decisionmaking about assumption of environmental risks); Stephen
Charest, Bayesian Approaches to the Precautionary Principle, 12 DuKE ENV-L. L. & POL'Y
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ignoring inconvenient provisions would be nil.
The paradox here is somewhat reminiscent of the familiar "no
purchase necessary" line used in contests as marketing ploys, where most
contest entrants make a purchase anyway. The ubiquity of these "no
purchase necessary" contests indicates that companies find them to be
effective marketing; the contests would disappear if there was no payoff for
the resources that are invested into the marketing and prizes. Many people
apparently buy the associated product merely because of the game and not
because they would have bought it anyway. Otherwise, the contest would
be unnecessary. "No purchase necessary," a disclaimer added to satisfy
various regulatory requirements, for some reason does not undermine con-
sumers' inclination to make a purchase.
Like a contest with no strings attached, the Stockholm Convention
comes with no punishments for noncompliance and therefore no apparent
downside for signatories or parties.40 The question remains, then, whether
a law can have any real upside without a corresponding downside. In the
process of achieving benefits, most domestic laws impose costs. Criminal
laws, for example, impose not only penalties on wrongdoers, but also
greatly complicate the planning and preparation of even the most success-
ful (undetected) crimes. This makes perpetration of the crimes more
costly, even where they go unpunished. There is also a chilling effect that
falls on perfectly legal activities that fall near the boundary of the rule-
people steer clear of breaking the law by forfeiting choices that could come
close to a violation. Similarly, administrative regulations carry not only
civil penalties for violations (sometimes criminal as well), but also impose
burdensome costs on industries. The downside to such laws (whether stat-
utes or binding regulations) is viewed as a necessary evil to achieve the
upside, such as protection of property or personal safety.
F. 265, 267-68 (2002) (discussing the distinction between ambiguity and true uncer-
tainty in forecasting environmental harms, and the problems with using a single princi-
ple for these two disparate problems); David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of
the Precautionary Principle, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1315, 1316-17 (2003) (arguing, contra
Sunstein, infra, that the precautionary principle is a necessary "corrective to cognitive
biases" that mistakenly prioritize immediate, concrete concerns over long-term, uncer-
tain harms); Bernard D. Goldstein & Russellyn S. Carruth, Implications of the Precau-
tionary Principle for Environmental Regulation in the United States: Examples from the
Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 66 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 247, 247 (2003) (arguing that the precautionary principle may be
problematic due to "potential inhibition of the development of more effective air pollu-
tion control technology[,] ... the inhibitory effect on further research[,] . . . and the loss
of focus on those hazardous air pollutant compounds and sources that provide the
greatest likelihood for toxicity and misplaced focus on individual rather than population
exposure"); Don Mayer, The Precautionary Principle and International Efforts To Ban
DDT, 9 S.C. ENVL. LJ. 135, 136-38 (2002) (arguing that divergent interpretations and
applications of the precautionary principle result in unpredictable results for attempts to
ban DDT worldwide); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L.
REv. 1003, 1011 (2003) (arguing that the precautionary principle appropriately caters to
various cognitive biases).
40. See OLSEN, supra note 3, at 117, 123. It is possible, of course, that noncompli-
ance could eventually affect trade partnerships or future memberships in free trade orga-
nizations, but the Stockholm Convention itself does not contain such provisions.
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Granted, the Stockholm Convention's requirements, to the extent that
they are honored voluntarily, contain costs for those currently selling-and
those using-the twelve POPs. These costs, however, are unlike the costs
incurred by those complying with criminal or administrative prohibitions
because they are not incurred in lieu of the costs of liability. This could
mean either that these laws (and others that similarly lack enforcement
provisions) are ineffective, or that we have found a new means of inducing
people to do the right thing without threatening them. The latter would be
a law with upsides but no downsides; could this be imported from the
international law setting to less exotic areas like protecting property rights
and eliminating interpersonal violence?
The "no purchase necessary" puzzle in international treaties overlaps
with the issue of "soft law" and "hard law" in global rulemaking.4 1 "Soft
law" is an agreed-upon standard of conduct implicitly intended to be nor-
mative, while explicitly lacking official consequences for violators. "Soft
law" seems like an oxymoron to those who have a more economic perspec-
tive on the law-there is neither clear deterrence nor anything objective to
shape individual incentives. This is not to say that norms do not motivate
decisions, but where parties have voluntarily hammered out the rules
themselves, the rules are more likely to reflect the parties' preexisting pref-
erences or values rather than to mandate something novel.
"Hammering out" terms sounds like the jargon of contract law, and
that is one way to view "soft law"-as a voluntary agreement between indi-
viduals staked on mutual trust rather than court enforcement. 42 Mutual
trust arrangements contain incentives that are driven by reputation.
Breaching the trust may limit one's future opportunities for desirable rela-
tionships, while keeping one's word can earn a reputation as a premier
trade partner.
International markets, however, are inscrutably complex, at least in
the aggregate, and few countries are in a position to boycott major import-
ers like the United States, even when the latter flouts some term of a partic-
ular international treaty.4 3 The "contract" model of soft law therefore
41. For an overview of the differing viewpoints on the distinction, see generally Gun-
ther F. Handl et al., A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 371 (1988)
(arguing that soft law is best understood as a mechanism to promote cooperation
between international actors); Robert 0. Keohane, International Relations and Interna-
tional Law: Two Optics, 38 H~Av. IrNr'L LJ. 487 (1997) (arguing that "soft law" must be
viewed as both moral normatavity and rational pursuit of self-interest); Cynthia Craw-
ford Lichtenstein, Hard Law v. Soft Law: Unnecessary Dichotomy?, 35 Irr'L LAW. 1433
(2001) (arguing that the form of the rule is less significant than the means of inducing
compliance, citing examples of extralegal "persuasion" by the International Monetary
Fund).
42. For more discussion of recent international environmental agreements and their
relation to contract principles, see generally Mark A. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obli-
gation in International Environmental Law, 76 TUL. L. REv. 843 (2002).
43. See Joel P. Trachtman, Decision: GATT Dispute Settlement Panel: International
Trade- Quantitative Restrictions- National Treatment- Environmental Protection- Applica-
tion of GATT to U.S. Restrictions on Import of Tuna from Mexico and Other Countries, 86
AJ.I.L. 142-148 (1992) (describing how Mexico withdrew from a legitimate complaint
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seems overly simplistic.
4 4
The Stockholm Convention is a treaty, 45 not an informal agreement or
joint resolution, which means it falls somewhere between "soft law" and
"hard law."4 6 There is no accepted term to describe this in-between posi-
tion-it is an awkward spot between innocuous well-wishing and coercive
enforcement, between laws that are "hard" and those that are "soft." ("Firm
law"? "Semi-soft"?). The possibility for such an in-between category raises
interesting questions about the function of laws generally. Even without
incentives like coercion or stigmatization, the rules have an aspirational
function that manages to influence behavior over time. By making norms
"international law," environmentalist ideals are elevated to a benchmark
status for behavior. Perhaps this benchmark of conduct will later mutate
into a mandate backed by force; or perhaps it provides a moral "higher
ground" for certain parties in future international agreements. Corpora-
tions can boast of their voluntary compliance with the guidelines for public
relations purposes. If nothing else, it offers a definitive demarcation line
between "good" and "bad," right and wrong, when it comes to making,
selling, or using pesticides-helping individual actors characterize their
choices in these terms. 47
Credos about what makes a country virtuous are not taken very seri-
ously, however, even if mushy treaty provisions fetch universal assent more
easily.48 The primacy of state sovereignty makes the power of effete rules
to encourage compliance even more mysterious.
Eric Posner and Jack Goldsmith have published a series of important
articles explaining the puzzle of "soft" and "semi-soft" international law
against the United States for GATT violations-centering on a tuna embargo against
Mexico-for fear of jeopardizing the NAFTA negotiations that were then underway).
44. The Stockholm Convention was intended to go further than "soft law." See
Mintz, supra note 38, at 330 (arguing that "the Convention's action-forcing provisions do
seem likely to reduce the production and use of POP-laden products"). Specific provi-
sions allow for (or even call for) subsequent amendments to delineate enforcement
mechanisms. For more detailed discussion of these specific provisions, see id. at
330-32.
45. See Handl et al., supra note 41, at 372-73 (discussing the significance of treaty
status for the outcome of subsequent litigation).
46. See OLSEN, supra note 2, at 49-61.
47. For more discussion of the view that international law helps shape norms, see
generally Joseph F. C. DiMento, Process, Norms, Compliance, and International Environ-
mental Law, 18J. ENVn_. L. & LrnG. 251 (2003) (arguing in favor of a New Model hold-
ing that international law's primary function is to foster collective action resulting from
nations' gravitation toward shared norms rather than from fear of sanctions).
48. From the standpoint of everyday politics, it is understandable why noncoercive
rules are expedient for international treaties, where everyone is concerned about pre-
serving sovereignty. See Handl et al., supra note 41, at 375 (recounting the observations
of earlier commentators that soft law is able to "overcome deadlocks in the relations of
states that result from economic or political differences among them, when efforts at
firmer solutions have been unavailing" and that "[al substantial amount of soft law can
be attributed to differences in the economic structures and economic interests of devel-
oped, as opposed to developing, countries").
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using a classic rational choice approach.4 9 Their model eschews moral or
normative explanations for voluntary compliance with unenforceable trea-
ties and instead posits very plausible self-interested reasons for the phe-
nomenon.50 Applying their model to the Stockholm Convention, the
United States and European nations must have had something to gain.
Some suggestions have been posited above, such as the creation of a new,
expansive market for replacement products by eliminating existing stock-
piles of pesticides. 5 1 This would also help explain the American insistence
on the "precautionary approach" verbiage instead of the "precautionary
principle"; 52 the latter could have been used to obstruct the introduction of
new pesticide products until the seller could prove their environmental
safety. Similarly, Article 6 of the Convention calls for extensive reporting
of the location and size of existing POP stockpiles in developing nations,
5 3
information that other countries may find strategic.
Posner and Goldsmith identify numerous reasons why hegemonic par-
ties may accede to the formalities of a treaty with multiple developing
nations, but it seems that most or all of them could be reduced to two
general principles: either to draw the others "into the fold," so as to better
coordinate future activities together (isolationism often goes hand in hand
with hostility to Western interests), or to "signal" the dominant party's seri-
ousness and willingness to cooperate, so as to win reciprocal conces-
sions.54 These strategies are vaguely reminiscent of "dinners and roses" in
courtships. Dinner dates are less about food and more about the opportu-
nity to obtain information about the other party-conversation skills, sense
of humor, level of romantic interest, etc.-and each dinner makes the next
dinner more likely to occur, signaling progress toward a desired relation-
ship. Roses are more complex. Silk flowers last longer and cost more, and
may be equally beautiful (they may even be convincingly scented), but are
49. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agreements: A Rational
Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 113 (2003); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115 (2002); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1113 (1999).
50. See id.
51. See discussion supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
52. See discussion supra note 39 and accompanying text.
53. See Stockholm Convention, supra note 1, art. 6, 40 I.L.M. at 538-39.
54. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Posner, International Agreements: A Rational Choice
Approach, supra note 49, at 116. Goldsmith and Posner state:
Nonlegal agreements serve different functions and can be modeled in different
ways. One model is the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Two states, or perhaps
more, under threat of mutual retaliation, reciprocally refrain from activities that
would otherwise be in their immediate self-interest in order to reap mutual gains
from cooperation. Another model is the coordination game, in which states
receive higher payoffs if they engage in identical or symmetrical actions than if
they do not. A classic example is driving: all parties do better if they coordinate
on driving on the right, or driving on the left, than if they choose different
actions. When two or more states can generate joint gains by coordinating their
behavior, then their gains can be maintained without threats of retaliation, for
the agreement is self-enforcing.
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considered a less romantic gift. The fact that real roses last only a few days
signals either willingness for ongoing expenditures or willingness to
expend resources somewhat whimsically on the recipient; sacrificial
actions are particularly valuable for signaling coordination in repeat-player
games.
The developed nations have long-term incentives to court the undevel-
oped nations into more treaties, including enhanced cooperation and inter-
dependence. Each treaty leads developing countries to divulge more
information about what occurs within their borders (like the locations of
large chemical stockpiles in the third world). The United States and
Europe may choose to offer token sacrifices ("roses") to signal their willing-
ness to cooperate earnestly (or contribute financially) rather than simply
dominating their less sophisticated neighbors.
A final paradox of the Stockholm Convention is the position of the
developing nations, who as a block constitute the only remaining market
for the banned pesticides. The irony is not that these countries portray
themselves as the victims in the situation-everyone does that in interna-
tional negotiations-but that the biggest customers for POPs would enthu-
siastically join the campaign to ban them. While it is easy to see why
Canada or Sweden would champion the cause, as they have little need for
pesticides and are the unfortunate natural repository for them because of
their proximity to the polar "drain holes" for these chemicals, the develop-
ing countries are a different story.
Signing onto a treaty to get a handout55 is understandable; requesting
a treaty that specifically bans products the nation regularly buys is more
puzzling. Of course, developing nations often lack the necessary internal
legal structures to control the importation or use of pesticides by private
parties, such as wealthy plantation owners. To the extent that these gov-
ernments are at odds with the local landowners, the ironic plea for America
and Europe to shut off the faucet at their end, so to speak, is sensible
enough. The underdeveloped nations tend to be smaller nation-states,
however, where the landed gentry is in a particularly strategic position to
exert influence over their officials and the positions they take at an interna-
tional convention. If the pesticides are causing obvious harm in develop-
ing countries, why was a treaty necessary to stop themselves from buying?
There is no purchase necessary.
55. Articles 12-14 of the Stockholm Convention call for technical and financial
assistance to be given from developed countries to those less developed. See OLSEN,
supra note 3, at 115-16. This also explains some of the "victim" rhetoric used by the
willing buyers of the POPs. Victims make good mendicants, and mendicants make good
victims-at least for rhetorical purposes. An opportunity for additional foreign aid, fun-
neled through the existing mechanism of the Global Environmental Facility (put in place
by other treaties), certainly helps explain their eager participation and ratification, even
if little is done locally to implement changes in practice.
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